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Chapter One

Where does India stand? – The problem of the poor
India is a compilation of contradictions and a study in contrasts. With 1.3 billion
citizens, India is the world’s largest democracy; but the nation that governs via
representation the world’s largest democratic populous is also home to its largest number
of poor. According to a 2016 World Bank report, “India is by far the country with the
largest number of people living under the international US$1.90-a-day poverty line, 224
million, more than 2.5 times as many as the 86 million in Nigeria, which has the secondlargest population of the poor worldwide...India accounts for one in three [of the poor
worldwide.]”1(emphasis added) India not only sustains the unexpected simultaneity of
persistent mass poverty with successful democratic practices but also uniquely includes
and relies on its poor for the success of its democratic operation. This is evident in Perry
Anderson’s statement, “a truly distinguishing feature of Indian democracy – one that sets
it apart from any other society in the world...In India alone, the poor form not just the
overwhelming majority of the electorate, but vote in larger numbers than the better-off.
Everywhere else, without exception, the ratio of electoral participation is the reverse.”2
The electorate’s resilience against an arguably justified sense of disenfranchisement with
a State that has failed too many on too many accounts is further evident in the nation’s
ever-rising voter turnout rates. With 540 million Indians voting, which is not only their
fundamental right but also foremost civic duty, the 2014 general election set a national

1
2

"Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016." World Bank. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
Anderson, Perry. "LRB · Perry Anderson · After Nehru." London Review of Books. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
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record with the highest ever voter turnout at 66.4 percent, putting India fourth in the
world rankings on voter turnout.3
Adding to this political-economy conundrum of India’s mass poverty parallel with
its democratic politics, is the fact that India is no longer just a poor economy; crossing the
two-trillion mark in 2016,4 India has been one of the largest contributors to the world
economy over the past decade; alone accounting for ten percent of the increase in global
economic activity since 2005 and forging a threefold rise in its national per capita Gross
Domestic Product (in purchasing power parity terms) since 2000.5 After taking 60 years
to reach the $one-trillion mark, India added the next trillion in just seven years; the
economy has almost doubled in size since the 2008 global financial crisis, and has more
than quadrupled from the start of this millennium.6 Today, India is the sixth and third
largest economy in the world and in Asia, respectively, while in purchasing power parity
terms, it has the world’s third-largest Gross Domestic Product.7
India has managed to establish its global presence on such a large scale by
delivering continued improvement in economic performance since the liberalization,
privatization, and globalization reforms undertaken in the early 1990s; when the
government, amidst a liquidity crisis, dismantled the ‘license raj’ system of tight controls
and permits in place since independence in 1947, thereafter diverging starkly from its
prior socialist-like planned economy model that had been in place for over 40 years. In

3

Timmons, Heather. "Here's How India's Record-setting Voter Turnout Compares to the Rest of the World." Quartz. Quartz, 13 May
2014. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
4
India GDP 1960-2017 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News.” India GDP | 1960-2017 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast |
News, tradingeconomics.com/india/gdp.
5
Corrigan, Gemma, and Attilio Di Battista. "19 Charts That Explain India's Economic Challenge." World Economic Forum. N.p., n.d.
Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
6
Raghavan, Sharad, and TCA. "India Is Now a $2-trillion Economy." The Hindu. N.p., 02 July 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
7
"COUNTRY COMPARISON :: GDP (PURCHASING POWER PARITY)." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence
Agency, n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
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the decades following independence, the nation suffered from a ‘Hindu growth rate’ of
3.5 percent,8 largely as a result of a highly interventionist state employing a misguided
import substitution trading regime.9 After three decades of generally low growth, during
which slightly more than one person in two lived under the official poverty line,10 the
Indian economy experienced a growth acceleration starting in the 1990s, thereafter,
sustaining rapid economic growth that averaged a rate of six percent in the 1990s and
eight percent in 2000s. Surpassing China in 2015, India established itself as the fastest
growing economy in the world, and is projected by the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund to continue as such indefinitely.11
While there has been a decline in the number of poor since the 1990s, the pace of
poverty reduction has been relatively slow. For instance, every one percent GDP growth
led to a 0.3 percent reduction of poverty in India, compared to China’s 0.8
percent;12combined with the fact that China had also seen higher growth rates for several
years previously leaves India’s overall poverty alleviation outcomes far behind those of
China’s. The growth patterns adopted in 1990s help partly explain the paradoxical nature
of high growth with low poverty reduction in India; since the patterns of economic
growth largely influence how inclusive such growth might be. For example, taking
advantage of housing the world's second-largest English-speaking population, India’s
growth has been primarily driven by the service sector, which contributes almost 60

8

Das, Gurcharan. “The India Model.” Foreign Affairs, 18 Jan. 2012, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/india-model.
Kholi, Atul. “Politics Of Economic Growth In India, 1980-2005: Part I: The 1980S On JSTOR.” Politics Of Economic Growth In
India, 1980-2005: Part I: The 1980S On JSTOR, Apr. 2006, www.princeton.edu/~kohli/docs/PEGI_PartI.pdf
10
Datt , Gaurav, and Martin Ravallion. “Shining for the Poor Too? :” Economic and Political Weekly, 13 Feb. 2010,
www.epw.in/journal/2010/07/special-articles/shining-poor-too.html?0=ip_login_no_cache%3D57f90f22307806827bd408a591db43f1.
11
Babones, Salvatore. "India May Be The World's Fastest Growing Economy, But Regional Disparity Is A Serious Challenge."
Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Jan. 2018. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
12
Sen Gupta, Abhijit, et al. Growth, Structural Change, and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from India. Nov. 2013,
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/31214/south-asia-wp-022.pdf.
9
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percent to the country’s GDP today, making India the second fastest growing service
economy in the world.13 Information technology alone accounted for $108 billion worth
of services exports in 2014-15, primarily to the United States and Europe.14 This too,
however, is not without contrast; India has arguably greater linguistic diversity than any
other large country with 1652 languages listed on the 1961 census, of which 122 are
spoken by over 10,000 people and the primary six are spoken by over 50 million people
each. Still, India is home to the second largest English-speaking population of 125
million people.15 India’s economic paradox is encapsulated by the different layers within
its economic structure, which Ashutosh Varshney notes in stating, “for nearly a decade
now, India has had the world’s fourth-largest concentration of dollar billionaires (after
the United States, China, and Russia), its third-largest middle class (after China and the
United States), and its single-largest concentration of poor people. This tripartite structure
is new...India is thus simultaneously rich and poor.”16
Given the somewhat arbitrary nature of poverty lines, a cursory look at the
income and consumption profile of the population is informative to our understanding of
where the masses stand and why India remains a low-middle income country. This
cursory look allows us to note, foremost, that the lower bound for the richest income
quintile (of Rs.1.5 lakhs) is just 1.5 times the nation’s per capita GDP and less than the
minimum income requirement (of Rs. 2.5 lakhs) for one to qualify for income tax. The
fact that just slightly over 20 percent of the population earns as much or above the

13

Hutt, Rosamond. "India's Economy in Numbers." World Economic Forum. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
ibid
ibid
16
"Journal of Democracy." India's Democracy at 70: Growth, Inequality, and Nationalism | Journal of Democracy. N.p., n.d. Web. 23
Apr. 2018.
14
15
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nation’s per capita GDP, along with the fact that not all those who fall even in the highest
income quintile earn enough to be eligible for income tax, indicates the low levels of
earnings that a majority of the population face; whereby, the top 20 percent earners
control 45 percent of the total income. Relatedly, while a political democracy with
diverse representation on all political fronts, India is a not a fiscal democracy; for every
100 voters it has only 7 income taxpayers. This astoundingly low tax-base results from
two factors: first, low earnings, especially in the unregulated informal sector that
accounts for 92 percent of the Indian economy, such that, 90 percent of the population in
urban areas and 95 percent in rural areas earns less than 2.5 lakhs annually, disqualifying
this majority from income tax liability. Second, equally if not more importantly, this
results from the state’s policy choice of setting the qualifier at a level equivalent to 250
percent of the nations per capita GDP, making India one of the most generous exemptors
in the world, since in most countries income tax becomes payable when one earns about
one-half or one-fourth of the average national income. So while not entirely surprising,
India sustains a political democracy without a commensurate fiscal democracy.
The task of highlighting the contradictions within the political-economy of this
nation, especially those relating to its poverty -- be that in its democratic politics or its
economic laurels -- was undertaken not for its intellectual intrigue and appeal but in order
put forth the following fundamental point about the Indian state: even though India often
attracts generalizations and stereotyping, it also most often defies them. And why
wouldn’t it, it is an enormous and varied land with a combined genetic, linguistic, socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity that is unparalleled by any other
nation. In fact, the probability of India’s inherent characteristics culminating in a ‘life of
8

contradictions’ was not entirely unexpected; we can turn to the prophetic words of
Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, who was a social reformer, Dalit leader and till date remains
one of the most celebrated pioneers of the Indian National Movement. When
disappointed by the Constituent Assembly’s lack of an official commitment to
incorporate the term ‘Socialist’ in the Indian constitution, even after the Assembly
acknowledged the imperative for redistribution, in his last speech before the them he
argued:17
On the 26th January 1950 [when the Constitution was to come into effect] we are
going to enter a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in
social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be
recognizing the principle of one man, one vote, one value. In our social and
economic life we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, continue
to deny the principle of one man, one value. How long shall we continue to live
this life of contradictions? (Emphasis added)
Many Indias within
The following section elucidates the various dimensions along which India
sustains its unparalleled diversity; building a foundation for the upcoming assessment of
how the political-economic structures of the Indian state were formed and justified.
Religion: India has remained a Hindu-majority state since independence, with
about 79.8 percent Hindus, 14.2 percent Muslims, 2.3 Christians and 1.7 percent Sikhs in
2011.18Even though less than 15 percent of Indians are Muslim, India is home to the
second-largest Muslim population in the world, next only to Indonesia. It is the birthplace

17

John Harris, “Politics and redistribution in India,” page 211, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics.27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr.
2018.
18
“C-1 Population By Religious Community.” Census of India Website: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner,
India, www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/c-01.html.
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of four major religions: Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism and Buddhism.19 Zoroastrianism
and Judaism also have an ancient history in India, each with several thousands of Indian
adherents. India has the largest population of people adhering to Zoroastrianism (i.e.
Parsis and Iranis) and Bahá'í Faith in the world, even though these religions are not native
to India.20 Relating to religion is the caste system - one of the oldest hierarchies and a
distinctive feature of Indian society - that is omnipresent and all-pervasive in the nation.
The term ‘caste’ can be used to mean Varna or Jait. Varna refers to a segment of the
four-fold division of Hindu society based on functional criterion, namely, Brahmins
(scholars), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants/traders) and Sudras (labourers).
There is a large sub-population that is completely excluded from the system, previously
called Untouchables, but now largely referred to as Dalits. While the Indian state has
worked to implement policies that reduce the disadvantages faced by ‘lower-castes,’
especially Sudras and Dalits, through reservations, caste continues to play a role in
“shaping both economic and social transactions.”21 Jati refers to a hereditary endogamous
status group practicing a specific traditional occupation. There are more than 3,000 jatis
in India. These are hierarchically graded in different ways in different religions.22 The
practice of caste system is not confined to Hindus alone. One can find castes among the
Muslims, Christians, Sikhs as well as other communities. There is the hierarchy of Shaik,
Saiyed, Mughal and Pathan among Muslims. Furthermore, there are castes like teli (oil
presser), dhobi (washerman), etc. among the Muslims. Similarly, caste consciousness
19

Daily Bhaskar, https://daily.bhaskar.com/news/NAT-TOP-india-cultural-religious-ethnic-diversity-4811522-PHO.html?ref=hf,
Web. 23 Apr. 2018
20
ibid
21
Kumar, Sunil Mitra. “Does Caste Influence Access to Agricultural Loans in Rural India?”, 3 June 2013,
www.ideasforindia.in/article.aspx?article=Does-caste-influence-access-to-agricultural-loans-in-rural-India.
22
Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Jati." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 09 Mar. 2016. Web. 23
Apr. 2018.
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among the Christians in India is not unknown. Since a vast majority of Christians in India
were converted from Hindu fold, the converts carried the caste system into Christianity.
In this view, one can imagine the extent of caste diversity and social cleavages in India.23
Ethnicity: There are many different ethnic groups who have migrated to India
over the course of centuries. Anthropologists are indebted to Sir Herbert Risley for the
elucidation of that most complex problem in ethnic classification, “The People of India”,
where he notes seven racial types: (1) Turko – Iranian, (2) Indo-Aryan, (3) ScythoDravidian, (4) Aryo-Dravidian, (5) Mongo-Dravidian, (6) Mongoloid and (7) Dravidians.
These seven racial types can be reduced to three basic types – the Indo-Aryan, the
Mongolian, the Dravidian. The vast population of India also consists of the jungle tribes
like the Bhils, the Konds, the Santhals, the Jarawas, etc; with over 700 tribes that have
been notified under Article 342 of the Constitution of India, classified as ‘Scheduled
Tribes.’ The largest number of main tribal communities - 62 - has been specified in
relation to the state of Orissa,24 with the majority living in the northeastern states of
Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and Nagaland. Smaller numbers inhabit the hills and
forests of central and southern India as well as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.25
Culture: There are close to 111 officially recognized dance forms in the country,
with the likes of Bharatnatyam, Kathak, Kathakali, Kuchipudi, Manipuri, Mohiniattam
and Odissi gaining a worldwide presence. Across India there are diverse folk dance forms
such as Bhangra of Punjab, Yakshagana of Karnataka, Bihu of Assam and Chhau of

23

"'In Spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India'." NPR. NPR, 03 Feb. 2007. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
"Tip | How Many 'Scheduled Tribes' Are There in India? And What Distinguishes Them from Other Communities? ('tribal' or
Otherwise) – Information Provided by the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes." Tribal Cultural Heritage in India Foundation.
N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
25
Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Adivasi." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 22 Dec. 2015. Web.
23 Apr. 2018.
24
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Jharkhand.26 Clothing styles vary based upon region, religion, geography, and climate,
with Saree and dhoti being the main traditional dresses of India. In fact, there are close to
80 recorded ways to tie a saree.27 There are numerous festivals celebrated throughout the
year in relation to seasons, religions, myths; some are exclusive to certain communities
and religions while others have a national and secular character about them. ‘Maha
Kumbh Mela’ festival in Allahabad, where millions of Hindu devotees took a ‘holy dip’
in the Ganges, was so massive a gathering that is was visible from space in 2013 via
satellite images.28
Language: As mentioned earlier, India is one of the most multilingual places in
the entire world - with more languages than those spoken in the entire Western
Hemisphere. A majority of the 1632 listed languages classified as dialects, the Indian
constitution officially recognizes 22 languages, of which Hindi and English are the most
widely spoken and used to conduct official state business. The high number of Indian
languages belong to five of the world's major language groups; Indo-European,
Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic, Tibeto-Burmese and Semito-Hamitic. According to the New
Delhi-based Indian Newspaper Society, India has 62,000 newspapers, with a staggering
90 percent of them in local languages.29 KPMG in India and Google found that Indianlanguage internet users numbered 234 million in 2016, far more than the 175 million
English-language internet users and projected the former group to grow to 536 million by
2021, far outpacing the growth rate foreseen for English-language internet users30
26

"Folk Dances of India - Region & State Wise." Traditional Folk Dances of India - Regional & State Wise. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr.
2018.
27
"How to Wear a Sari in India." World Hum. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
28
"Kumbh Mela Festival." BBC News. BBC, 13 Feb. 2013. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
29
Asia-PacificIndia. "Medium for the Masses: How India's Local Newspapers Are Winning Rural Readers." Knowledge@Wharton.
N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
30
"India's Internet Is Led by Local Languages, Not English." EMarketer. N.p., 12 July 2017. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
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Regions: India has all types of physiographic regions, namely, the Northern
Mountains, Indo Gangetic Plains, the Peninsular Plateau, Thar Desert, and the Coastal
Plains. India is home to one of the wettest, coldest and most humid places in the world.
This landscape is further augmented by island clusters in the form of The Andaman and
Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep. In settlement patterns, the urban population makes
up approximately 33.5 percent of the total population, meaning that over half the
population lives in rural areas, where 80 percent of India’s poor live.31 The entire region
of India has been territorially divided into subnational political units comprising 29 states
and 7 union territories; the former being governed by state governments while the latter
fall under the purview of the central government. This category of subnational political
units, in the form of states, is arguably the most important dimension along which
diversity within India is evident; especially because, as the next section will elucidate,
these states were formed largely on the basis of groups that shared related cultures,
specifically language. Thus, while these states capture much of the social diversity within
India, they also add their own dimension of variation, and a rather important one, to the
larger Indian context - that of state and local level politics and related matters like
community mobilization and social movements, which directly influence developmental
outcomes for the residents of these states. This is evident in Singh’s statement:32
Indian states, the subnational political unit that is vested with constitutional
authority over social policy vary greatly in the strength of the solidarity of their
political community. These differences in subnationalism have played a critical
role in generating differences in the progressiveness of social policy and levels of
social development...in terms of the education and health of the population.

31

"India's Poverty Profile." World Bank. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge
Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
32
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An example of such variation, as Forbes magazine notes, “[India’s] 36 states and
union territories range from giant Uttar Pradesh with more than 200 million people to tiny
island territories...with fewer than half a million....Uttar Pradesh and neighboring Bihar
have a combined population roughly equal to that of the U.S., but a combined GDP less
than that of Michigan.”33
The aggregation of vastly different places, peoples, and societies, all united by
one national identity in all their diversity, is followed by a statistical exercise in
constructing averages, delivering to us singular facts on ‘India.’ The World Bank’s
website information page on India first notes, “[a]ny effort to understand India must
begin by acknowledging the existence of many Indias...well-being and prosperity vary
widely across the country.”34 Our characterization of India as featured by conundrums
and diversity can be seen most profoundly in the stark variation seen, in any given sphere
of life (including and stemming from the several dimensions delineated above), within
and across the nation’s various regions. This variation dictates that any fact or statistic
which might best describe India entirely depends on what part of the country one is
investigating. These differences are presented graphically by Prerna Singh:35
While certain states have attained levels of social development, conceptualized in
terms of the education and health of the population, approaching those enjoyed by
middle-income, industrialized countries, other states have fared worse than
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In a country the demographic size of India, these
divergences translate into dramatic differences in the quality of life for millions.
In the 1950s, residents of Bihar (which has a larger population than France) were
less than half as likely to be literate as people in Himachal Pradesh. In the 1970s,
women in Orissa (which has a larger population than Argentina) were expected to
33

Babones, Salvatore. "India May Be The World's Fastest Growing Economy, But Regional Disparity Is A Serious Challenge."
Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Jan. 2018. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
34
"India States Briefs." World Bank. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
35
Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge
Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
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live, on average, over twelve years less than women in Punjab. In the 1990s,
children born in Madhya Pradesh (which has a population just a little lower than
Turkey) were five times less likely to survive through infancy than those born in
the state of Goa. Even today, women in Maharashtra (demographically equivalent
to Mexico) are four times less likely to die during childbirth than their
counterparts in Assam.

This state-wise disparity clearly indicates that any worthwhile and informative
assessment of the socio-economic developmental outcomes faced by the Indian
population can only be truly understood via a disaggregated state-level analysis. The
states are not only distinctive in their histories, peoples, and norms, but also in their social
welfare policies, which are implemented at that state level, allowing for further deviations
within the policy realm. As noted in the Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics,
“[d]evelopmental performance of Indian states continues to diverge along several
dimensions, including economic growth, distribution and poverty alleviation, and quality
of governance. Why this should be so remains a complex, important, and underinvestigated area of research.”36 The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to conduct such a
disaggregated analysis, in order to understand the true nature of poverty and deprivation
across the different regions within the country. A subnational research design better
equips us to handle the spatially uneven nature of processes such as social development.37
A comparison of subnational units allows us to look beyond the common-place
characterization of India as “backward,” by recognizing and evaluating different cases,
with some achieving substantial development while others remain egregiously backward,
by decomposing the variation that remains hidden by national characterizations and
36

John Harris, “Politics and redistribution in India,” page 211, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics.27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr.
2018
37
Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge
Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.
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averages. This is disaggregated analysis is undertaken in the next chapter, which employs
data analysis to discern state-level performance on poverty, health, and education
outcomes for the Indian population by residence. Additionally, the question of who
provides welfare in India provides further support for such a subnational research design.
Article 246 of the Indian constitution divides policy areas among three lists – the Union,
State, and Concurrent lists. The Union and State lists consist of subjects under the
exclusive purview of the central and state governments respectively, while the
Concurrent list is composed of subjects upon which both levels of government have
jurisdiction. Health is on the state list. Education was shifted from the state list to the
concurrent list by the 42nd Amendment in 1976. Institutionally, the primary
responsibility for developmental policies has rested with states rather than the national
government. States play the key role in the formulation and execution of policies
regarding both education and health, and account for nearly 90 percent of total
government expenditure on these issues.38 The importance of noting this institutional
design can be seen in the following quote by a former education minister, who observed
that prior to 1976, “[w]hether it was primary education or secondary education or
university education, the states if they were so inclined, could do what they liked without
the Center having any voice in the legislation they passed or in the administration of the
system”39 On this account of institutional design, as well as the previously noted ‘Many
Indias within’ section that outlined demographic variation throughout the country, arises

38

Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Chapter 1,
page 16, Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018
39
Ibid, page 17
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the need to clarify the exact nature of the Indian federation, which the following section
will do.

The Indian Federation: Unity in Diversity
In India, the federal system emerged after Independence as a means of managing
ethnic and linguistic diversity: demands for autonomy could be accommodated more
easily than in a unitary structure like that of Sri Lanka. Indian states vary dramatically in
their languages, social structures, economies, and party competition, and the federal
system institutionalized these differences rather than attempting to homogenize them.
This federal structure generally has been successful, particularly in mitigating linguistic
conflict in south India in the 1950s and 1960s.40
India can be classified as a ‘holding together’ federation, where the centre created
the states as they came to be, unlike the U.S., where pre-existing states came together to
form one nation. So how did India carve out its states? The central question through
India’s freedom movement and post-independence nation building was how this fledgling
democracy might be reconciled with its long-standing demographic diversity. Given that
federalism is organized via territorial units, this question becomes even more specific in
the context of center-state relations, whereby, India had to find a way to consolidate its
geographically concentrated diversities with its national democratic experiment. Here, it
is worth noting that India’s social and cultural diversities can be reduced to four main
forms: caste, religion, language and tribe. Of these, language and tribe are territorially
concentrated, making them the mainstay of Indian federalism. It is fortuitous that the
40

Paul Staniland, “Insurgencies in India”, page 168, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics.27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr. 2018

17

Indian population is well-dispersed across the nation when viewed by religion, with the
only notable exception being that of a Sikh concentration in Punjab, because the carnage
brought on with the India-Pakistan partition served as sufficient warning of the
communal-violence and instability religious identity in politics can bring. Religion came
to be seen as India’s principal fault line, with the immediate post-independence
leadership countering this by delegitimizing religion-based demands for states within the
federation. We see this in the case of Punjab, where, demands for the state based on the
distinctiveness of Sikhism with respect to Hinduism were rejected, but when proposed
along linguistic arguments of Punjabi being different from Hindi, Haryana and Punjab
were born as separate states, one Hindi speaking, the other Punjabi speaking.41 While
religion is not privileged in politics, the Indian State ensures the protection of religious
diversity by guaranteeing freedom of worship, separate ‘personal laws’ such as the
religiously governed codes for property inheritance, divorce and marriage and privileges
for minority educational institutions. Varshney notes:42
After partition, religion could not be the basis of federal statehood, a principle
followed consistently for the more than six decades of Indian democracy
regardless of which party ruled in Delhi...language and tribe became the
foundations of Indian federation—partly because of their geographical
concentration, and in part because these two identities were not viewed as
profound existential threats to India.

Given this socio-politically acceptable mechanism of state-formation under
India’s ‘holding together’ federal nature, Varshney investigates the question of what
relationship this Indian federation shares with its nationhood. To answer this question, he

41
42

How has Indian Federalism Done?, Studies in Indian Politics, 1, 1 (2013): 43–63
ibid
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evaluates the nature of Indian nationhood and argues that unlike France’s Nation-state
type, which “essentially represents a coincidence of the territorial boundaries of a state
and the cultural boundaries of a nation,” such that, this type of nationhood tends to be
assimilationist in character, and focuses on the removal of ethnic or cultural diversities,
India is a state-nation, which “consists of states that have strong cultural diversity, some
of which is territorially based and can potentially create demands for independence.”
State-nations, as defined by Varshney, function on two levels: (1) creating a sense of
belonging to the larger political community (in this case, India), (2) while
simultaneously institutionalizing guarantees for safeguarding politically salient
diversities, such as language, religion and culturally sacred norms.43 With territoriallycentered cultural differences, federalism allows the implementation of culturally
respectful policies that also facilitate stability and unity. As such, “the concept of statenation is both about recognizing diversities and building larger all-India loyalties.” While
it is certainly not an easy political undertaking to constructively encourage identification
with one’s diverse subnational background simultaneous to a feeling of unity in being
Indian, survey results from 2005 indicate that this process has been largely successful in
India; with less than 12 percent of the 5385 survey respondents identifying solely with
their state and over 66 percent identifying with both, India and their state.44 Thus, a
commitment to the larger entity of India has been cultivated not by suppressing
diversities, but by recognizing and supporting them. The basic idea of the federal bargain
is that states will retain loyalty to India even while acting with significant autonomy
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within it. 45Additionally, an important facet of the success of Indian federalism, as
constructed linguistically, is that Indian identities tend to crosscut as opposed to
accumulate; such that, depending on where she lives, the first language of a Muslim
could be Hindi, Urdu, Bengali or any of the many others, or that a south Indian Dalit
shares little with a north Indian Dalit; and being a Brahmin in north India is very different
from being one in south India. “When politics mixes with such a social landscape,
political entrepreneurs mobilize their communities on a whole variety of issues, creating
serious internal pluralism in state politics.”46 This allows for a remarkable fluidity in how
and along what identity dimensions one might construct a majority-minority framework,
giving Indian federalism a benign edge.
Having clarified the exact nature of the Indian federation, we are better equipped to make
a case for differences in subnationalism as an a plausible explanation for the variation in
development outcomes experienced across the states, which will be undertaken in the
following chapters.. We can turn to Prerna Singh’s definition of Subnationationalism:47
[Subantionationalism is] the identification with, or aspiration for, a self-governing
homeland located within the boundaries of a sovereign country.The ideology and
movement of subnationalism incorporate both cultural and political dimensions –
people with a belief in a shared past and a common culture, based often but not
necessarily on language, who identify with, or desire the creation of and control
over, a political-administrative unit within a sovereign country that corresponds to
a territory they believe belonged to their forebears.
The foremost characteristic of subnationalism is its association with political selfdetermination. Unlike any other category of identity, be it race, gender, religion or class,
subnationalism demands self-determination based on what is seen as one’s historic
45
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culture, group and homeland, while unlike nationalism, it is about political-administration
within a larger sovereign entity that subnationals simultaneously identify with. While
identity politics has a long-standing history of destructive outcomes, as related to
chauvinism, xenophobia, and violence, the limited institutional scope of subnationalism,
whereby it does not demand sovereignty or dissociation with the larger uniting entity, in
this case being Indian, is actually an important factor in making subnationalism and stateidentity a constructive force that leads to social cohesion, which can lead to the
materialization of public goods that are beneficial to all. While a large body of
development literature is conclusive in noting top-down State intervention as the prime
mechanism for provision of public goods, it is argued here that differences in societal
action demanding such provisions can be a key variable in influencing the State’s
decision to prioritize the implementation these services. Indian states are in charge of
administering a large list of subjects, which largely scope matters that directly impact
everyday lives of their residents, and thus are also the ones most personal to citizens.
Managing 61 items on the ‘State list’ as well as co-managing 52 items on the ‘Concurrent
list’48means that levels of social mobilization can prove to be instrumental in influencing
how states decide to allocate their limited resources among competing items on their list
and what items end up making it to a government's curated policy agenda.
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Chapter Two: Data Analysis
This chapter undertakes state-level data analysis on outcomes achieved in health,
education, and poverty by the Indian states, to discern which states have performed better
or worse than expected of them.

Need for government intervention

Public welfare economics cites two main reasons for government intervention in
the economy: market failure and redistribution. Intervention for human development can
be justified on both these fronts: an inefficient market system that is unable to allocate
resources to their best use leads to high levels of poverty, such that, if the markets were
well-functioning, outcomes would be surplus maximizing. Poverty is not a best outcome
as it is characterized by low demand for goods and services, consequently lowering their
supply and preventing further growth and augmentation of the economy. Additionally,
poverty itself is inefficient since it wastes a crucial economic resource: potential human
capital. Poverty also creates a self-explanatory need for redistribution of resources. Thus,
without a doubt, the government has a strong imperative to reduce poverty, and it must
use policy and regulation to this end. We therefore need to identify factors are effective to
this end.
Additionally, poverty alleviation in India is not only a moral imperative but also
an economic and political one. India has been lauded as one of the fastest growing
economies with a massive demographic dividend. But mass poverty is simply inefficient
– it is a waste of India’s human capital. Thus, for true economic efficiency, poverty
22

alleviation is needed. India is also the world’s largest democracy. While we can turn to
scholars like Przeworski who categorically defines democratic systems as based foremost
in equality before law, without any other qualifying factors since democratic outcomes
are inherently uncertain. Yet, the heart of India’s constitution is embodied in the
preamble, which states that India is a “Sovereign, Socialist, Secular and Democratic
Republic.” This clearly indicates a certain public commitment toward general welfare;
and as a representative democracy, India must provide better outcomes in the interest of
those whose name it governs in.

Need to go beyond poverty: A Human Development approach
India’s poverty reduction since 2005 has given cause to celebrate – a report by
McKinsey49 notes that the share of the population below the official poverty line fell from
37 percent in 2005 to 22 percent in 2012—the fastest rate of poverty reduction India has
achieved since the economic reforms of the early 1990s—as an impressive 137 million
people rose above this threshold. But above it looms a hard question: is ending extreme
poverty enough to achieve a decent standard of living and sense of dignity for the poor?
India’s human development indicators show that deprivation extends well beyond the 22
percent of Indian who live below the official poverty line. Forty percent of the nation’s
children under the age of 3 suffer from malnutrition. Fifty percent of its households have
no access to improved sanitation facilities. Seventy percent of those between the ages of
15 and 65 have only a primary school education—or no education at all. These statistics
are symptomatic of the broader issue of poor living standards experienced by a
49
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significant portion of India’s population. On this account, we turn to the concept of
human development, which is defined as a process of enlarging people's choices to lead a
long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and be educated, and to have access to
resources needed for a decent level of living.50

Need for state-wise assessment
While poverty alleviation has undoubtedly been a top agenda for several
successive central governments, understanding growth and development in India requires
a state-wise assessment. India is large and diverse, comprising numerous states and their
own societies within. The federal structure provides not only a more efficient
administration of the vast territory and populace but also serves to better represent the
diverse communities within India. Growing interregional disparities strongly support the
assumption of varying socio-economic conditions between states. Additionally, the
development indicators we are concerned with, namely health, education, and poverty,
are matters that fall under the state and concurrent list according to the constitution of
India, thereby allowing variations in our outcomes of interest based on the particular state
and conditions prevalent within.
States in India perform differently on socio-economic outcomes. Some of this
difference may arise from aspects that state policy does not and cannot directly influence,
while others arise due to differences in policies, their implementation, and consequent
impact. We want to discern what impacts policy agendas adopted by a state, to learn how
one might better orient policy toward development. In order to do this, we must identify
50
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the states that have performed well due to their policies; or the states that have performed
differently than what would be expected based on their given resource endowment and
prevailing conditions. Let me explain this with the following analogy: My father’s
completion of his bachelor’s degree is far superior a success than my completion of my
bachelor's degree. His childhood featured financial insecurity in a small town, while mine
did not. He started off with few resources. Given his initial endowment of resources,
access, network, social capital, and all other relevant factors, he performed exceedingly
better than the level of education and success that was expected of him. On the other
hand, my initial endowment of resources, access, network, social capital, and all other
relevant factors, was substantially higher than his endowment when he was 18. Thus,
even though both of us have completed a bachelor’s degree, our level of success, and the
inputs that went into this success, are not the same! He performed better than what was
expected of him, whereas I have performed well within the expectations of someone who
is endowed with my resources. It is therefore far more interesting to investigate what
factors made him complete his bachelor’s degree instead of the factors that made me
complete mine, even though the outcome of receiving a college degree was the same.

Empirical model
In order to determine which states have performed outside of their expected
levels, this thesis uses regression analysis to determine what the expected or predicted
level of performance for a state is based on its endowments. Using state level data, this
econometric model estimates the level of achievement in the human development
indicators under consideration: poverty, health, and education. Thereafter, the predicted
25

level is compared with the states actual achievement on these indicators, to determine
which states have outperformed and which have underperformed, and accordingly rank
them. This thesis thereafter undertakes case study analysis of the best and worst
performing states, to delineate the most crucial factors that influenced their performance.

Outcome of Interest: Poverty
To estimate a state’s predicted level of poverty, this thesis controls for the states
net state domestic product per citizen (NSDP per capita), Median years of schooling in
the population, and the proportion of its socio-economically disadvantaged population
(ST and SC population.) NSDP per capita is an indicator of how wealthy a state is, and
therefore, what level of resources it might be endowed with as well as how well-off its
residents might be. Median years of schooling accounts for human capital development
that could influence returns to labor. Proportion of ST/SC population indicates the level
of systematic disadvantage that this group of the state’s populace faces. The first two
covariates allow us to control of wealth and the third covariate allows us to control of
discrimination, such that, the regression model is now able to estimate what level of
poverty the state should have, given its endowment of wealth, human capital and
disadvantaged peoples. In essence, we can no longer attribute higher levels of poverty
than those predicted, to the states lack of wealth or high prevalence of disadvantaged
groups, and vice versa. This helps us expand our investigation of factors relevant to
poverty and its alleviation, beyond the non-policy variables like the state’s wealth and
social composition, to other factors, specifically the ones that are policy-variables.
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Another covariate considered for this model was the proportion of rural
population, since 80 percent of the poor live in rural India.51 In rural areas, less than 5
percent earn enough to pay taxes, only 2.5 percent own a four-wheeler vehicle and less
than 10 percent have salaried jobs.52 However, due to high correlation between
percentage of rural population and NSDP per capita, the author dropped the former as an
explanatory covariate.
Model:
γ = β0 + β1 (Median schooling) + β2 (log NSDP per capita) + β3 (ST/SC %)

Outcome of Interest: Health
An overarching health outcome indicator not only measures the performance of the
health sector but is also closely linked to other development processes, as health is
closely linked to economic, social, and environmental factors.53 This thesis uses two
measures to account for the standard of health in a state: life expectancy at birth and
infant mortality rate.
1) Life Expectancy
Life expectancy is perhaps the most important measure of health. It is readily
comparable across states and asks the most fundamental question concerning health: how
long can the typical person expect to live? Life expectancy increases due to healthcare
improvements like the introduction of vaccines, the development of drugs or positive
behavior changes like the reduction in smoking or drinking rates. Life expectancy at birth
51
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is a summary indicator of mortality conditions and, by proxy, of health conditions. It
summarizes mortality risks and trends across all age groups, including older people. This
measure, however, does not directly address non-fatal health outcomes, disability etc.
except through the proxy of mortality risks. “The justification of life expectancy at birth
in representing the health dimension is on the grounds of intrinsic value of longevity,
association of long life with adequate nutrition, good health and education and its
linkages with other valued goals” 54
To estimate a state’s predicted life expectancy, this thesis controls for the states
proportion of rural population (percent rural), median years of schooling (median
schooling), proportion of the state’s population that falls in the highest wealth quintile
nationally (fifth wealth quintile), proportion of it socioeconomically disadvantaged
population (ST/SC percent). The rationale of controlling for rural population and highest
wealth quintile is to control for wealth resources. Median years of schooling accounts for
the likely impact on health due to returns on education that allow one to maintain better
health. ST/SC population as mentioned previously controls for disadvantaged groups.
Additionally, all these covariates also capture a sense of the proportion of population that
likely have and likely do not have resources to enhance their health outcomes. As
mentioned above, life expectancy is a function of factors beyond healthcare, including
socioeconomic and environmental conditions. Therefore, controlling for poverty rate and
proportion in the highest wealth quintile allows us to put forth a reasonable prediction of
the level of life expectancy, while being able to investigate reasons beyond these when
assessing differences in the actual achievements.
54
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Model:
γ = β0 + β1 (Median schooling) + β2 (Highest wealth quintile) + β3 (ST/SC %) + β4
(Percent rural)

2) Infant mortality rate
The infant mortality rate (IMR), defined as the number of deaths in children under
1 year of age per 1000 live births in the same year, has in the past been regarded as a
highly sensitive (proxy) measure of population health. This reflects the apparent
association between the causes of infant mortality and other factors that are likely to
influence the health status of whole populations such as their economic development,
general living conditions, social wellbeing, rates of illness, and the quality of the
environment.55 Factors that directly impact infant mortality include the mother’s prenatal
health status, both their access to healthcare facilities, environmental conditions, and
socioeconomic status. IMR is internationally recognized as a measure of health as well as
a robust proxy for relevant factors that impact the overall structure of health in a state.
Therefore, therefore, this thesis uses IMR to capture these conditions.
To estimate a state’s predicted infant mortality rate, this thesis controls for the
states net state domestic product per citizen (NSDP per capita), proportion of the state’s
population that falls in the lowest wealth quintile nationally (first wealth quintile), the
number of females for every 1000 males (Sex ratio), and the median years of schooling
attained by the population aged 6 and over (median years of schooling.) The rationale for
controlling for NSDP per capita as well as lowest wealth quintile remains the same as
55
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noted in previous sections. The author controls for the sex ratio of a state because of the
long-standing history of gender discrimination in many regions of India, as made
colloquially popular by Amartya Sen’s “100 Million Missing Women” article, which
notes how over 100 million more women should be alive in Asia and Africa according to
normal biological birth rates, but gender selective abortion, female infanticide, and
overall neglect of women’s health have led to skewed demographics. He states:56
In view of the enormity of the problems of women’s survival in large parts of
Asia and Africa, it is surprising that these disadvantages have received such
inadequate attention. The numbers of “missing women” in relation to the numbers
that could be expected if men and women received similar care in health,
medicine, and nutrition, are remarkably large. A great many more than a hundred
million women are simply not there because women are neglected compared with
men.
Infant mortality rates would relate to the sex ratio not only directly via female
infanticide, but also indirectly in that states with higher females are likely to provide
better healthcare for females overall, reducing the likelihood of high IMR. The author
controls for median years of schooling in a state because better education likely translates
to better health choices, thoughtful family planning, and overall information access for
the population, reducing the probability of high IMR.
Another covariate considered for this model was the average BMI of women,
which the author found to be statistically significant in its impact on IMR. However,
since women’s nutrition can be influenced directly via policy intervention, the author
dropped this as a control variable to predict expected IMR. The author also considered
including poverty rate or rural population, but NSDP per capita sufficiently captured the
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resource conditions of a state so the author did not include these unnecessary and highly
correlated variables in the model, to avoid issues of multicollinearity.
Model:
γ = β0 + β1 (Log NDSP per capita) + β2 (Sex ratio) + β3 (Lowest wealth quintile) + β4
(Median schooling)

Outcome of Interest: Education
To estimate a state’s predicted education level, the author employs enrollment in
higher secondary school (XI and XII grade) as the dependent variable. While the author
also considers overall attendance rates in schools as well as median years of schooling of
the population as potential dependent variables, the foremost outcome of interest is
determined to be higher secondary enrollment. This is because attendance does not
necessarily indicate learning and is also easily misreported, while median years of
schooling in the population is a function of conditions prevalent over the last decade and
more, not informing us much about current conditions of education in the state. Thus,
enrollment in higher secondary school is found to be the best indicator of the status of
education in a state, because to be eligible for enrollment in XIth and XIIth grades, one
must pass exit exams for all previous grades, which likely indicates true learning.
Additionally, higher secondary schooling is not covered under the Right to Education
Act, allowing this to be a non-policy variable. Students who are enrolled in higher
secondary have passed all previous grades and opted into pursuing their education
further, without the law requiring them to do so, indicating a private value their families
find in their education.
31

The model used to predict a state’s higher secondary gross enrollment rate
(HSGER), the author controls for the median years of schooling attained by the
population aged 6 and over (median years of schooling), and proportion of the state’s
population that falls in the highest wealth quintile nationally (fifth wealth quintile), the
proportion of ST/SC population (ST/SC percent) and proportion of agriculture and allied
sector contribution to the state gross domestic product (Agriculture in GDP). The author
controls for median years of schooling because better educated parents are likely to better
educate their children, and pursuing higher secondary education is a choice that families
make, often contemplating between sending their grown up children to earn wages or to
earn a high school diploma. Median years of schooling captures families that recognize
the value of schooling. Controlling for the highest wealth quintile accounts for families
who are able to afford not only foregoing any wages their children can earn but also the
costs of their higher education. ST/SC proportion controls for the disadvantaged groups
that historically have lower educational rates as well. Agriculture contribution to state
GDP attempts to capture the likelihood of someone attending school given the prevalence
of farm employment.
When investigating attendance as the dependent variable, the author found
poverty rate and stunting rate of children below five years of age statistically significant
in explaining attendance rates. When investigating median years of schooling, the author
found poverty rate and proportion in highest wealth quintile statistically significant in
explaining variation in this dependent variable across states.
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Model:
γ = β0 + β1 (Median schooling) + β2 (Highest wealth quintile) + β3 (ST/SC percent) + β4
(Agriculture in state GDP)

About the data
The data used for this thesis’ regression analysis has been obtained from state and
central government open data sources, as well as the National Family Health Survey
2015-16. The following table lists the variables considered along with the corresponding
source, time period, relevant summary statistics, and particular notes if applicable.
Only major states have been accounted for, therefore, union territories of
Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, Puducherry,
Andaman and Nicobar Islands have been left out. This was done primarily because union
territories are governed by the central government, and therefore would not inform our
state-wise analysis much, while adding noise to the dataset. Telangana has been collapsed
into Andhra Pradesh as much of the data used is from 2011, whilst Telangana was
declared the 29th State of India in 2014.57
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Variable

Period

Source

Notes

Poverty Rate

2011

Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation,
Central Statistics Office,
Social Statistics Division.
September 2017
Government of India
www.mospi.gov.in

Proportion of
population below the
State Poverty Line

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/The-story-of-Indias-29th-State-%E2%80%94-Telangana/article14384461.ece
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Each State has a poverty line calculate calculated by the Suresh Tendulkar committee method.
Per Capita NSDP at
2004-05 prices (Rs.)

Annual/
2012-13

Selected Socioeconomic indicators
2017, Central Statistics Office,
Government of India
data.gov.in

Log transformed by
author

Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) is defined as a measure, in monetary terms, of the volume
of all goods and services produced within the boundaries of the State during a given period of
time after deducting the wear and tear or depreciation, accounted without duplication. Divided
by the total population of State to give Per Capita data.
Scheduled Tribe and
Scheduled Caste
Population

2011

Selected Socioeconomic indicators
2017, Central Statistics Office,
Government of India
data.gov.in

Combined ST and SC
population
proportions

Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are among the most disadvantaged socioeconomic groups in India.
SexRatioFemales100
0Males

2011/
Decadal

Census - Selected Socioeconomic
indicators 2017, Central Statistics
Office, Government of India
data.gov.in

Number of females per 1000 males, according to state

First Wealth Quintile

2015-16

National Family and Health
Survey, 2015-16

Percent distribution of the de jure population in lowest wealth quintile discerned at a national
average, according to residence and state, India, 2015-16
Fifth Wealth Quintile

2015-16

National Family and Health
Survey, 2015-16
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Percent distribution of the de jure population in highest wealth quintile as discerned at a
national average, according to residence and state, India, 2015-16
Attendance

2015-16

National Family and Health
Survey, 2015-16

Percentage of de facto household population age 6-17 years attending school (including preprimary school) in 2015-16 school year according to state, India, 2015-16
Higher Secondary
Enrollment

2015-16
Ministry of Human Resource
Development
https://data.gov.in/resources/grossenrolment-ratio-2013-14-2015-16

Total enrolment in a Higher Secondary (Grades XI and XII) level of education, regardless of
age, expressed as a percentage of the eligible official school-age population corresponding to
the same level of education in a given school-year.
School-age Population: Population of the age group which officially corresponds to the
relevant level of education.
Median Years of
Schooling

2015-16

National Family and Health
Survey, 2015-16

*Author has
calculated the
population median as
an average of Male
and Female median
years of schooling

Percent distribution of the de facto female and male household populations age six and over by
highest number of years of schooling completed and median number of years of schooling
completed, according to state, India, 2015-16
Infant Mortality

2015-16

National Family and Health
Survey, 2015-16

Infant mortality rates
for the five-year
period preceding the
survey, by state/union
territory, India, 201516
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Infant mortality: The probability of dying between birth and the first birthday.
Life Expectancy

2010-14

Human Development Index
Report, United Nations
Development Program (UNDP)
India and Sample Registration
Survey (SRS) based life table
2010-14.
https://www.disabledworld.com/calculators-charts/inlifespan.php

Due to lack of data,
the author has used
the life expectancy of
Assam for Arunachal
Pradesh, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram,
Nagaland, Sikkim,
Tripura, and of
Maharashtra for Goa.

Life Expectancy: the average number of years a person is expected to live on the basis of the
current mortality rates and prevalence distribution of health states in a population
Stunting

2015-16

National Family and Health
Survey, 2015-16

Height-for-age is a measure of linear growth retardation and cumulative growth deficits.
Children whose height-for-age Z-score is below minus two standard deviations (-2 SD) from
the median of the reference population are considered short for their age (stunted), or
chronically undernourished. Children who are below minus three standard deviations (-3 SD)
are considered severely stunted.
Sample: Children under age five years

Indicator

Variable

Dropped

Poverty

Log NSDP
ST/SC
Median years of schooling

Rural population (collinear)

Life expectancy

Median years of schooling
Rural population
Highest wealth quintile
ST/SC

Log NSDP
Poverty rate

IMR

Sex Ratio, Females per 1000 Males
First wealth quintile
Log NSDP

BMI
Gender gap in literacy
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Median years of schooling
HSGER

Median years of schooling
Highest wealth quintile
ST/SC
Agriculture proportion in state GDP

Stunting
Rural population
Log NSDP

Empirical results
The states’ predicted levels are estimated using beta coefficients determined by
Model #1 for each indicator. The other models are provided as supporting evidence for
the nature, direction, and significance of the relevant covariates to the outcome of
interest.
Based on the following results, the author investigates the cases of Kerala and
Uttar Pradesh in the following chapters to explain how degrees of subnationalism
influenced developmental outcomes experienced in these states, as supported by the
following results. Subnationalism did so foremost by impacting the degree of government
prioritization of social services in their policy agendas. While itself not a direct policy
variable, subnationalism solidarity has been identified and argued as the primary
determinant of socially oriented policy choices.

POVERTY
Model #1

Covariate

Adjusted R-Squared: 0.5220

Beta
Coefficient

Standard
Error

T-statistic

P-value
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Median years of schooling

-.30829

1.509174

-0.20

0.840

Log of NSDP per capita

-15.13631

4.112619

-3.68

0.001

Proportion of Scheduled Caste
and Scheduled Tribe

.0467189

.0645029

0.72

0.476

Constant

180.1114

37.62311

4.79

0.000

Model #2

Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3139

Covariate

Beta
Coefficient

Standard
Error

T-statistic

P-value

Median years of schooling

-4.468123

1.202378

-3.72

0.001

Constant

46.13555

7.390826

6.24

0.000

Model #3

Adjusted R-Squared: 0.5220

Covariate

Beta
Coefficient

Standard
Error

T-statistic

P-value

Log of NSDP per capita

-16.03139

2.724235

-5.88

0.000

Constant

189.592

28.9537

6.55

0.000
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State

1

2

3

Andhra
Pradesh
Arunachal
Pradesh
Assam

4

Predicted level
of poverty

Actual
Difference
Level of
Poverty

Ranking

17.69411519

9.2

4

8.494115193

Meghalaya
23.67354103

34.7

-11.02645897

28
J&K

27.30113321

32

-4.698866787

20

35.49026341

33.7

1.790263408

12

25.9149691

39.9

-13.9850309

29

2.025217213

9.9

-7.874782787

25

-0.263819296

5.1

-5.363819296

22

12.60028845

16.6

-3.999711551

19

11.89554791

11.2

0.695547914

16

14.74862348

8.1

6.648623475

6

23.14006673

10.3

12.84006673

2

26.36537373

37

-10.63462627

27

18.13070318

20.9

-2.769296824

18

12.38364163

7.1

5.28364163

8

Bihar
5
6
7
8
9
10
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LIFE EXPECTANCY
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Model #4
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Model #5

Adjusted R-Squared: 0.4083
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5.6

8.215

24
25

40.7

51.2

-10.508

Maharashtra

29.3

23.7

5.606

Manipur

27.9
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EDUCATION
HIGHER SECONDARY GROSS ENROLLMENT RATE
Model #1
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Model #3

Adjusted R-Squared: 0.2818
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8
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43.43
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29
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Chapter Three
This chapter traces the emergence of subnationalism in Kerala and how that encouraged
development in the region.58
In the mid-nineteenth century, with all social, economic, and political arenas of
life strictly structured around caste and religious identities, the Malayali-speaking regions
of Travancore and Cochin, which comprise present-day Kerala, sustained one of the most
oppressive and devout caste systems in all of India. While Brahmins comprised only
about one percent of the population, they controlled most resources and commanded most
authority across all social, political, and economic matters, situating themselves, without
a doubt, at the top of this rigid system. They received tangible benefits from a Hindu state
in the form of free meals and exemption from capital punishment or rigorous
imprisonment, while engaged in lucrative professions like trade and money-lending that
perpetuated their economic privilege, and most crucially, they occupied positions of
power in the princely states. Maharajas (Kings) ruled their princely states in the name of
Hindu deities, which made Brahmins especially useful to them for carrying out religious
ceremonies, unlike the previously prominent caste of Nairs, who were Sudras, could not
do without ‘contaminating’ the temples. Additionally, the Brahmins’ knowledge of
English and the British administrative system made them a popular choice for delegation
of political power. Of course, the privileged treatment of one group automatically implies
a commensurate disadvantage for all others, but in this region, the caste system
relentlessly oppressed all non-Brahmins, such that, there were strict restrictions on their
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use of public facilities, like roads, wells, and temples. They went so far as to delineate the
exact physical distance that a Sudra must maintain from Brahmins, because unlike the
upper castes across the rest of India who frowned upon touching lowers castes, the
Brahmins in Travancore and Cochin believed that even proximity, to all non-Brahmins
who they deemed as untouchables, caused ‘pollution.’
In this setting, which was termed “a madhouse of caste” by social reformer
Swami Vivekananda, there was no sense of community either within Hindus across
castes nor across the larger Malayali political community. Guided by the ancient Hindu
texts regarding government, the Travancore government directed its expenditures toward
maintenance of the Palace, civil services, and the army along with religious functions,
with no systematic efforts of improving the welfare of its people. The few social services
that were available, like Ayurvedic medicine and indigenous schools, exclusively served
upper castes. Lower-castes were not allowed admission into public schools and an
absence of sanitary education and practices led to high mortality rates arising from
preventable diseases.
However, Protestant missionaries who had arrived in the region in the early 19th
century supplemented the provision of public services, as they considered education to be
a crucial requisite for their religious work, and provided the lower castes, “toward whom
their proselytizing activities were targeted and whom they converted in large numbers,
their first access to a systematic education.”59 They brought with them the first allopathic
dispensaries, Western education, public health education, and most crucially, the notion
of “equality of all before God,” which served all members of the community, regardless
59
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of the all-pervasive and deeply internalized caste hierarchy, allowing for the emergence
of an ideological counter to the oppressive caste system. The Travancore government
grew weary of these large-scale conversions and their implications on the viability of the
Hindu state. Additionally, concerns regarding British annexation also grew, as evident in
a letter from Lord Dalhousie to the Maharaja of Travancore, “which stated that ‘unless
averted by timely and judicious reforms, annexation of Travancore is a distinct
possibility.’”60 Combined, these concerns led the government to undertake limited
reforms in the social sector, however, these largely remained an exercise exclusive to
paper for many years thereafter, but did serve to slowly dismantle the vehicle of
institutionalized discrimination.
In this context, the region saw some instrumental changes in social and economic
spheres, whereby, a possibility of redefining the prevailing norms emerged. These
changes included, in the social arena, an undermining of the pervasive caste-system under
the guidance of the missionaries and their teachings as well as wider access to western
education across all strata of a deeply unequal society. In the economic realm,
commercialization of agriculture, abolition of caste-based agrestic slavery, the state’s
granting of ownership rights to tenants, and rapid rise in foreign trade fostered
unprecedented economic mobility across caste lines. Arising from the western education
and now economically flourishing agrarian group, was an upwardly mobile elite that
sought political advancement. Under the previously mentioned reforms, which although
had remained exclusive to paper, came the opportunity for this newly trained and
mobilized elite from diverse social backgrounds, to engage in systematic contestation for
60
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political power. These reforms “emphasized merit rather than ritual status as the key
criterion for recruitment to the sarkar (government) service…[f]or the first time in the
history of the state, political power was now potentially accessible to members of all
castes and communities and elites from politically un/under-represented groups,
especially the Nayars, Syrian Christians, and Izhavas competed zealously and at times,
bitterly, to stake their respective claims.”
Such efforts by these newly-minted challenger elites, however, were successfully
blocked by the small yet powerful Brahmin group. It is important to note here that these
Brahmins hailed from across the Western ghats and were non-Malayali, making Malayali
identity the primary source of cohesion among the native elites; uniting Christians,
Muslims and lower caste Hindus under the umbrella of their Malayali land against the
“foreign” Brahmins. Without giving up their caste or religious identities, the Nayar,
Christian, and Izhava elites drew on shared symbols of Malayali identity like language,
culture, and history, to come together in competing against the non-Malayali Brahmins.
Recognizing that individually they might remain unheard and unrepresented, these
groups initiated the first stirrings of Malayali subnationalism. “The espousal of a
Malayali subnational identity, which drew on ancient myths of a shared origin, common
heroes, and culture, was a purely instrumental calculation. Once it was evoked, however,
it took on a powerful emotional valence.”61 The rigor garnered by the movement is most
prolific in the “‘Malayali Memorial;’ a petition demanding greater native representation
in public services submitted to the Travancore government in 1891, which had over
10,000 signatories and claimed to express the grievances of all Malayalis—Nambudris,
61
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Nayars, Syrians, other Christians and Izhavas.”62 This served as the first united protest
that “embodied not merely the grievance of a section of the people, but that of the
community as a whole.”63 Unification along a Malayali community, across castecommunal lines, began to materialize at the start of the 20th century. This period saw
even the worst-off in the lowest rungs of the caste hierarchy, the “untouchable” Pulayas
and Parayas, mobilize behind their leader Aiyankali to protest and dismantle the
remaining mechanisms of discrimination. The overarching identification of the elites with
their Malayali homeland curbed the potential for conflict inherent in caste and religious
mobilization, uniting them across their other social cleavages. A large number of panKerala institutions and organizations further institutionalized and solidified this identity,
spreading to the masses via the ‘Aikya Kerala’ (United Kerala) movement that began in
the 1920s and demanded a united Malayali homeland and “fostered a recognition of the
concept of equal rights for all.”64
A “Kerala-wide consciousness of shared community” allowed for a societal
consensus on the need for provision of health and education services to all Malayalis
without discrimination. This subnationalism instilled a belief that “the well-being of all
sections of the population was the collective responsibility of all Malayalis.”65 As such,
both, upper and lower castes worked together to eradicate caste-based disabilities and
move toward a socially equitable society that served all members. Public support was
manifest in innumerous petitions, signed by growing numbers, to the government
demanding the establishment of hospitals and schools. Consequently, the Travancore
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governments’ expenditures on education and health increased sharply, and in contrast to
prior reforms aimed solely at the elites and upper castes, these served all members. This
is evident in the government's proclamation to educate all children irrespective of social
identities and defray the entire cost of primary education in the state, as well as lifting
restrictions banning ‘untouchables’ from departmental schools, even introducing
affirmative action policies for lower castes via scholarships and fee waivers. Most
notably, in the 1940s, the Travancore government instituted midday meals for all students
in government primary schools, simultaneously intervening to positively impact their
education and health outcomes. This policy has continued uninterrupted since its
introduction, expanding significantly in the 1990s, even to other Indian states.
The anti-caste and subnational movements fostered a political consciousness in
the community, which encouraged them to hold their government accountable and
complaints criticizing inaction or low quality in health and education became
commonplace. Such complaints prompted the Travancore government to approach the
Rockefeller Foundation, which had set up in India after the First World War, to establish
a “public health department on modern lines in 1928.”66 While driven by its own agenda
to research specific diseases, the Foundation focused on preventing malaria and filariasis,
instead of water-borne cholera that ran rampant in the state. Still, their program was a
resounding success and resulted in Kerala becoming the first Indian state to eradicate
endemic malaria in 1965. It also provided a foundation to institutionalize public health
provision, such that, while lower than education spending, medical expenditure increased
six-fold during the period of 1900-1945; primarily spent on programs for vaccinations
66
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and sanitation to curb preventable diseases that had previously caused high mortality,
especially among the lower social groups. At this time, the Travancore government
provided welfare largely in opposition to the British, who now complained that the
princely states were providing too much welfare.
An important and distinguishing characteristic of Kerala was the active popular
involvement with the public goods provided. The public was encouraged to keep a check
on these services, ensuring the quality of governance and effectiveness of services were
top notch. This put Travancore and Cochin ahead of most other Indian provinces on most
developmental indicators, including literacy rates and infant mortality rates. Yet, in
absolute terms, these were still quite low; half the population was illiterate and life
expectancy loomed at a meagre 29.5 years, while still uneven across demographic groups
and geographic regions. Here, Malabar, the third Malayali region under British control,
fared terribly on literacy and infant mortality compared to its Malayali brothers and sister
in the princely states of Travancore and Cochin.
The post-independence years marked a critical period in Kerala’s developmental
trajectory, whereby, taking advantage of the newly instated democratic institutions,
electoral competition became a foremost mechanism of holding elected governments
responsive to public demands. There emerged a pattern of close contestation between the
Communist Party and Congress Party; and the former’s campaign on a subnational
narrative forced the latter to adopt Malayali subnationalism as well, further reinforcing
community cohesion along Malayali identity even after independence. This led to
unprecedented gains in education and health for members across all social strata, leading
to equitable outcomes across gender, ethnic, rural-urban, and regional lines.
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Kerala was formed on November 1, 1956, following the same mechanism of state
formation being used across the country of bringing together regions which a spoke a
common language. Accordingly, Princely states of Travancore and Cochin along with the
British ruled Malabar were established as one entity under the state of Kerala. While
different in their socio-economic conditions, the three regions shared their language Malayalam - and henceforth were bound together. The success and depths of Malayali
subnationalism is most evident in the petitions submitted by the Akiya Kerala movement
to the States Reorganization Commission (SRC), in charge of craving out Indian states in
a newly democratic nation. The petitions noted the essential need for a United Kerala in
ensuring the welfare and development of all Mayalyalees, where this long-yearned
homeland would be governed by natives who share “an attachment to the land and the
people, which very often rises stronger and higher than reason and probably life
itself...would lead Malayalis to toil for Kerala’s development”67 It is interesting to note
the demand and support for the inclusion of Malabar, which by all accounting measures
would at best be a developmental liability to the new state, were argued along deeply
subnational notions like “Malabar can come into her own only as a part of Kerala state.”
The newly formed state of Kerala created history by electing the Communist
Party of India (Marxist) - the CPI(M) - to its state legislature - the first time a Marxist
government was democratically brought to power anywhere in the world.68 The party’s
success has been attributed “above all, by its ability to manipulate the regional patriotism
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of all Kerala.”69 The state’s first chief minister, EMS Namboodiripad, is considered the
architect of modern Kerala. Under his leadership, immediate efforts were undertaken to
reform remnants of the conventional socio-economic class structure, paving the path for
Kerala’s long-term equitable and progressive development. Foremost were the
introduction of the Education Bill and the abolishment of the feudal land ownership
system under what has been heralded as “one of the most radical and successful land
reform bills in the world.”70 In the 1960s, Kerala was home to the highest number of
agricultural workers in India, but suffered from deep inequality in the distribution of land,
allowing exploitation of peasants and landless laborers by landlords, who owned 37
percent of the land while constituting only 2.3% of all agricultural households. In
advocating for land rights for the landless, further deepening mass consciousness against
caste-based discrimination, and other related equitable reforms, the Communist
government gained instant popularity among the disadvantaged populous of Kerala. The
Land tenure system reforms are seen as the “foundational feature of Kerala’s
development...and social and economic progress.”71
Successive governments, irrespective of party, have overwhelmingly focused on
the provision and expansion of primary education and healthcare. The CPI(M) and
Congress have without exception alternated control on the state government every
election cycle, making both parties highly responsive to public opinion. “In recent years,
Kerala’s history of a powerful and inclusive subnationalism has become established
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enough to be showcased as a model in a speech by the Indian Prime Minister.”72 The
Communist Party’s platform of welfare for all Malayalees has been an overarching guide
in the state, regardless of which party is actually in office, as the other forms the
opposition and encourages accountability, while still serving as a force for political
mobilization in the community. Social welfare has emerged as the foremost policy
platform on which the two parties compete intensely and relentlessly attempt to outdo the
each other in the expansion of the social security net. This commitment is “brought out
by the striking fact that no major public service or redistributive program in Kerala has
ever been reversed, despite a precarious financial position and a decline in central
financial support.”73
That Malayali subnationalism has taken deep popular roots has been evident time
and again. For instance, a 1996 survey showed that 91 percent of the Hindus, who are the
dominant religious group in Kerala, believed it is the government’s duty to protect the
rights of religious minorities, compared with 60 percent Hindus across India who shared
this sentiment. Kerala’s post-independence extensive social policy, as formulated and
implemented by democratic governments, has been characterized by a redistributive
nature. Social service provisions have been undertaken commensurate to well thought out
targeting of beneficiaries coming from the most disadvantaged groups like Scheduled
castes and tribes, women, rural populations, socially backward residents of Malabar
region and the poor population. This is in stark contrast to the investments in secondary
and higher education that have occurred throughout other Indian states, which by design
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have benefitted the elite segments most. Compared with other Indian states, Kerala saw
lower GDP per capita for most of the post-independence period, only surpassing the
national average over the last decade. Yet, its per capita government expenditures on
health and education have consistently been the highest. The masses in Kerala have
inculcated a political consciousness, awareness, and activism, far above the Indian
average as indicated in surveys conducted through 1967, 1996, 2004. This is a crucial and
distinguishing feature of Kerala and accounts for the public vigilance that has been
instrumental in ensuring the effectiveness of health and primary education services; for
example, in monitoring and curbing absenteeism of government teachers and healthcare
workers.
Bottom-up activism has allowed public concerns to dictate the government's
policy agenda, leading to top-down state policies that best represent public interests. As
such, Kerala has achieved the equivalent of middle-income countries in its literacy rates,
with a life expectancy of 74 years it is 10 years above the average Indian life expectancy
and falls in the top 30 percent countries in the world. In 1950s, Kerala’s Infant Mortality
was similar to India’s, but unlike the rest of India, Kerala focused on women’s education
and advancement over the following decades and has been able to achieve unparalleled
success in reducing IMR. “Today a child in Kerala is almost five times more likely to live
beyond her first birthday as compared to a child in any other state in India. Kerala’s IMR
puts it among the top 33 percent of all countries of the world.”74 These resounding
achievements remain incomplete without noting the equitable manner in which they have
been accomplished. For example, “various surveys suggest that income has not been a
74
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major determinant of access to better health facilities in the state.”75 Unlike the urbanrural discrepancy in women’s life expectancy (67 years versus 59 years) across India,
Kerala sustains equality at a high 75 years. Muslims in Kerala are also better off, with a
90 percent literacy rate they as likely as their Hindu Malayali brothers to be able to read
and 30 percent more likely the average Indian Muslim. “A rural scheduled caste female is
more than twice as likely to be literate if she lives in Kerala as compared to any other
state in India. A member of the Scheduled Tribes is almost 20% more likely to be literate
in Kerala than another Indian state. Social indicators in the northern Malabari districts,
which were at a distinct development disadvantage at the time of Kerala’s formation, are
now virtually equivalent to the rest of Kerala.”76
Today, Malayalis are justly proud of the social development achievements made
by their homeland. It is important to note here that their sense of community identity,
while certainly reinforced by such warranted pride, does not stem from it. As this chapter
has highlighted, the path of Malayali subnationalism was initiated after socio-economic
changes that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century facilitated a process of elite
competition for political power. These challenger elites from diverse social backgrounds
jointly employed historic but latent symbols that exemplified their shared culture, namely
their language --Malayalam. Mobilizing along their shared identity untied them against
the non-Malayali Brahmins who had conventionally commanded authority and
maintained an oppressive social system in the region. The growth of the Aikya Kerala
movement in the subsequent decades transmitted Malayali subnationalism to the masses,
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paving the way for a politically active citizenry that was effective in influencing its
government's policy agenda in favor of provision of public goods, along with societal
monitoring of such provisions, so that all of Kerala might have welfare and development
as evident in the state’s health and education outcomes.
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Chapter Four
This chapter77 traces the historical social dynamics within the state of Uttar Pradesh, to
show how the lack of a subnational solidarity as well as the presence of powerful
associations on dimensions above and below the sub-nation, like national, caste, and
religious identities, have hampered social development in the state.
In the mid-nineteenth century, Muslims constituted only 13 percent of the
population of the Northwestern Provinces of Agra and Awadh, which comprise presentday UP, but like the non-Malayali Brahmins in Travancore, they dominated the social,
political, and economic life of the province. They held significant sway over land and
government services - the two most important sources of power in the region.
Additionally, Muslims also prevailed in the social and cultural life of the province, as
evident in the preference of Urdu as the form of expression due to the continued
dominance of Muslim elites in the community’s cultural life. “Life in the towns of the
province was suffused with Persian-Urdu etiquette and was conducted in an
overwhelmingly Muslim idiom.”
Like Travancore, the Northwestern provinces also witnessed key exogenous
changes in the mid-nineteenth century which impacted the prevailing socio-economic
conditions. These changes were similar to those occurring in Travancore; namely, the
emergence of a challenge to the caste system, changes in agriculture and trade, and
limited opportunities for Western education. Growth of railways led to an expansion in
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trade, creating a wealthy class of middlemen, predominantly from Hindu merchant castes.
Colonial officers opened government schools and colleges that served as the first
opportunity for citizens to become literate in English. These opportunities led to an
improvement in the socio-economic well-being of the politically non-dominant Hindu
merchant caste, cultivating them into an upwardly mobile elite that could now attempt to
seek political power that now their higher socio-economic status warranted. At this time,
the British found their administrative system inefficient, and introduced two crucial
reforms: recruitment to government services based on merit and the introduction of the
elective principle into local government. Growing concerned about the domination of
certain groups, they introduced caste and communal reservations in government services.
These reforms benefited the Hindus more than they did Muslims; for example, Hindus
were better able to adapt to English education, as they had done previously with Urdu
when the Mughals had come to India, whereas large portions of Muslims continued to
attend private schools that instructed Islamic studies in Urdu. As such, a class of
challenger elites was formed in the Hindu merchant group, who were now able to
compete for power and attempt to overthrow the centuries-long dominance of Muslim
elites. This led to intense competition for political power between the two groups.
At this time, “the differences within Hindu and Muslim communities were greater
than the distinctions between the two.” Even though the two groups shared many
symbols, including a common spoken language be it called Hindustani, Hindi, or Urdu.
“Yet, in their attempt to break Muslim dominance over positions of political power,
challenger Hindu elites chose to emphasize the divisive symbols of Hindi and Urdu as the
distinct, exclusive, and mutually opposed mother tongues of Hindus and Muslims
68

respectively, over potentially unifying symbols, such as Hindustani as a shared lingua
franca for the province.”78 This was possible because Hindi written in Devanagari script
is comparable with colloquial Hindustani but distinct from written Urdu. Therefore,
mobilization of Hindu challenger elites in UP, even though similar to Travancore in
uniting along shared language, took place along religious lines. Since the dominant
Muslims were native to the province and as such could not be made an ‘out-group’ along
subnational sentiment, religious rather than subnational symbols were more useful to
them. Threatened Muslims in turn championed Urdu in Persian script as the official
vernacular of the province, instated agitational institutions like the Urdu Defense
Association, and denounced the “Hindi movement” as malicious toward Muslim
interests. Seeing the electoral success of Hindu elites in local elections, Muslim leaders
turned to the British rulers for patronage as their only method to maintain their privilege.
Requests included separate electorates for Muslims and weightage in any representative
system; these were the first stirrings of what lead to Muslim separatism and bloody
communal violence in the next decades in India.
At this time, “an analysis of local newspapers in the province showed that [elites]
came also to mobilize for policies, and goods and services, including social services, for
the exclusive benefit of their group.”79 In demanding schools and colleges for the
advancement of their ‘countrymen,’ the elites employed terms like nation, nationality, or
countrymen in reference to members of their respective religions, unlike Kerala where
such terms were inclusive of all residents. The elites began viewing development not only
along communal lines, but worse, as a zero-sum game where they not only promoted the
78
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advancement of their own group but also prevented that of the other. There was no
common identity and no demand for the collective welfare of all the state’s residents.
“The lack of elite pressure or popular demand meant that social policy did not occupy a
prominent place on the policy agenda.”80 The lack of community mobilization and
demand for social services left the British and Christian Missionaries as the primary
source of discerning what few services they might provide. Few initiatives included
expanding schools in select towns, sanitation programs, and a gradual increase in health
care facilities, which were largely met with popular indifference. A long-serving British
magistrate and collector, W. H. Crooke, “noted that an absence of fellow-feeling among
the residents of the state made them ‘destitute of regard for the public weal’ and
prevented them from acting ‘to secure what is of primary importance to their welfare.’”81
At the start of British rule, the Northwestern Provinces were cited as the model for rest of
India, but to the shock of the administrators, social statics showed it had turned into the
most illiterate region of the country.
Until the early twentieth century, the Hindu-Hindi and Muslim-Urdu identities
remained exclusive to the elites in these groups. “The diffusion of elite identities to the
population at large is contingent on their espousal by a sociopolitical movement or
association.”82 Just how the Aikya Kerala movement brought the masses on board with
their challenger elites, political-religious organizations in the Northwestern provinces,
like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League, “played a critical role from the 1920s
onward in the mass dissemination of the mutually reinforcing and divisive religious80
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linguistic identities of Hindi-Hindu versus Urdu-Muslim.” Gandhi, growing concerned by
what he saw as increased social division, promoted Hindustani in either Persian or
Devanagari script to build unity, to no avail however, as the proliferation of religious
organizations and movements had created sufficient divide. This was amplified by the
British who provided separate electorates for Muslims, and regularly followed their
policy of “divide and rule” to further their own interests. By the 1940s, Hindu and
Muslim identities were firmly embedded in the popular consciousness of UP. Singh
notes:83
At the end of the colonial period UP therefore had clearly not witnessed the
emergence of any kind of a subnational identity. Instead, the province had turned
out to be the crucible for the creation of Pakistan as a homeland for the
subcontinent’s Muslims and the emergence of Hindu nationalism, which was to
remain an important force in the politics of India after independence.
UP has not be able to establish any sort of subnational identity, as most evident in the
lack of a noun, like Malayali, Tamil, Rajasthani, Punjabi, Bengali and so on, to describe
the people of UP.84 Even its name is a direct translation of Northern Province, as there
was no naturally fitting names like those of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, or Rajasthan, and the
Constituent Assembly did not find a name representative of the diversity within,
eventually hastily agreeing on Uttar Pradesh.
UP was formed as purely an administrative unit; its boundaries hardly indicate or
encourage a shared sense of identity in culture or history. Several petitions to the SRC for
carving out other, better representative states from UP were refused primarily on grounds
of promoting the national good. “The most important, and eventually successful,
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secessionist movement that UP faced has been the demand for a separate hill state of
Uttarakhand/Uttaranchal...In recent years, encouraged no doubt by the success of the
Uttarakhand agitation, demands have resurfaced for the breakup of UP to form a range of
new provinces: Harit Pradesh, Doab Pradesh, Bundelkhand, Purvanchal, and Awadh
Pradesh, to name only a few.”85 Additionally, social cleavages along religion persist,
while those along caste have become the state’s most important ethnic fault line in recent
years, owing to lower caste mobilization and formation of Dalit parties. Thus, “the locus
of popular identification in UP has tended to lie either above the subnational community,
with the national realm, or with ethnic identities.”86
Following Independence, UP “had succeeded in projecting their province as the
‘heartland’ of the new nation,” due to its history as the birthplace of Hinduism, leading
role in the National Movement, and a demographic enormity that bestowed it with the
single largest number of seats in the central parliament. This has allowed for UP
politicians to wield immense power; all but two prime ministers during the period of
1947-1991 hailed from UP. Jairam Ramesh, a prominent UP politician noted, “The future
of India is inextricably linked to what happens or does not happen in UP.”87 As such, the
state came to view itself as more synonymous with the nation, to their own, and even the
nation’s, detriment. Its lack of subnationalism was argued to be an asset; as seen in the
words of UP’s first Chief Minister, “the only viable administrative unit that was
unaffected by either linguism or provincialism...[UP’s greatness lies] in its people’s sense
of oneness with other parts of India, overriding local and state considerations”88 As such,
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UP’s constant prioritization of India and the central government has cultivated a norm of
the politicians rarely being concerned with local development, instead, yearning for
prominence in New Delhi.
“UP’s propinquity to the national domain – both in terms of national leaders
controlling state politics and state leaders pursuing power at the national level –
completely crippled subnational politics in the state.” The National Election Survey of
1971 indicates, in stark contrast to Kerala, the residents of UP were more concerned with
national politics and higher proportions identified more with the nation than their state. In
line with national considerations, voters consistently voted for the ineffective Congress
party, as support for the party which reigns in New Delhi. Government expenditures
followed the central agenda instead of state needs, prioritizing spending on economic
services with no regard for social services.
The lack of identification with, or mobilization around, a subnational identity
played an important role in the low levels of interest in, consciousness of, and proclivity
to participate in, the public life of the state on the part of UP’s citizens. Relatedly, there is
little vigilance or demand for accountability; “Drèze and Gazdar document a longstanding pattern of popular indifference and inertia toward problems in the delivery of
education and health services, notably teacher and doctor absenteeism.”89
Since the 1990s, politics and popular identification have been based on religion
and caste. In late 1980s, the Bharatiya Janata Party began growing and mobilizing Hindu
support in UP, in contrast to its subnational movement in Rajasthan. During this period,
UP also witnessed powerful lower caste movements, culminating in a proliferation of
89
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caste-based parties, the most prominent of which are the militant dalit party named
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP), which primarily represents
backward castes, especially Yadavs and Muslims. The politicization of caste was evident
in voting patterns in UP, where over 50 percent voted in line with their own caste through
the 1990s, compared with Kerala’s 5 percent or all-India average of 26 percent.
Thereafter, governance is UP has been characterized by the targeting of social
expenditures toward specific groups, in what appears to be clientelist politics. While even
these targeted policies have made little impact, the question about the viability of
employing targeted policies in a society that is largely underdeveloped is too intertwined
with the sentiments and politics of the region to receive a fair appraisal, as desperately
needed for the sake of the region.
There is a lack of political will and interest when it comes to improving social
services for its people. This is evident in the states poor implementation of the nationally
sponsored Midday Meal program, disinterest in the success of the Total Literacy
Campaign, and sustained decline in government spending on health and education since
the 1990s. This is sadly evident in UP’s position as the only Indian state with a lack of
innovation in policy, as noted by Singh:90
Kerala is famous for its literacy drives, Tamil Nadu for its nutrition schemes,
Maharashtra for employment guarantee, Gujarat for drought relief, Karnataka for
panchayati raj, Himachal Pradesh for primary education, West Bengal for land
reform...Even poor, BIMARU states such as Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh have
launched important social initiatives such as the Shiksha Karmi program and the
Education Guarantee Scheme respectively, which were subsequently adopted at
an all-India level.
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This government apathy is matched by public indifference, which likely reinforce
one another, ending in a vicious cycle of low development and unaccountability. “The
political fragmentation of UP along caste and religious lines has been mirrored in the
social sphere...based on extensive field research, Drèze and Gazdar argue that this ‘highly
divided nature of the rural society’ has ‘seriously constrained’ collaborative public action
to ensure the effective provision of social services in UP’s villages.” Singh notes that,
“interestingly, the UP government itself highlights “public apathy” as one of the main
causes for the “disarray” of social services in the state (http://upgov.nic
.in/upinfo/up_eco.html)”
The government and public failure to delineate any conception of a progressive
social policy has resulted in UP experiencing a sustained plague of some of the worst
human development indicators in all of India. UP has the worst malnutrition rates in the
country, with near half its children being underweight and over half are stunted. It has the
worst infant mortality and maternal mortality rates in the country. A report by the WHO
reports the density of Allopathic doctors per lakh population in UP is 63.5, near the all
India level of 61.5. But when disaggregated by educational qualification, it shows some
astounding statistics: it drops to 35.9 for allopathic doctors with more than secondary
schooling, implying that 27.6 do not have even secondary education. This drops further to
a staggering 11.7 for allopathic doctors with a medical qualification, far below the all
India average of 26.2 and worst in the country.91
Literacy rates remain below the national average, even though significant gains
were made in the past decade due to central government and International donor agencies
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implementing large-scale educational campaigns, including notably Operation
Blackboard, the Education Guarantee Scheme, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, and the District
Primary Education Program. For all its focus on targeting dalits, UP does not have much
to show for it; with its overall underdevelopment leading to a reality in which a dalit
women in Tamil Nadu is better off on all social indicators than a upper-caste women in
UP.
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Conclusion
This thesis determined an estimated expected performance of the Indian states on
development outcomes of health, education, and poverty, after controlling for covariates
that indicated a state’s resource endowment, in different spheres like human capital or per
capita net state domestic product. The aim was to identify states that have performed
above and below what could be expected of them, conditioned on their resources. The
findings of this thesis support recent literature on human development, specifically Prerna
Singh’s work on welfare and solidarity in Indian states. The state rankings across the
three indicators in this thesis resonate with the findings of Singh.
Following in her line, this thesis puts forth the argument of subnational solidarity
as a key determinant of developmental performance. The intuition behind this, as
supported by the evidence presented in the case study chapters, is that in controlling for
non-policy variables, the data led to estimations that likely can be attributed to policyrelated matters. While not focusing on specific policies, this thesis addresses the factors
that influence good, pro-social and pro-poor policy choices by some states and not others.
This is absolutely essential to identify and note, since India remains plagued by high
regional disparity, and without cultivating an enabling environment, imposition of even
well-thought out polices might not take root. In this regard, the data analysis chapter
actually captures exactly that – different social policy choices leading to different
outcomes, while different levels of subnationlism has been identified as the primary
source of influencing what items make to a state’s policy agenda in the first place. The
argument here is not whether a specific policy is effective or not, because although that is
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important, this thesis has identified subnational solidarity as a necessary requisite for
good policies to gain traction and eventually become effective. While this thesis focuses
on two states, this analysis can be applied to the other states as well. A crucial
consequence of subnationalism as pro-social enabling environment, for policy, relates to
a cautioned decentralization of governance; whereby, those echelons of government that
citizens interact with most should be in charge of providing social services
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